In the recent case of Crystal Shipping Inc. A/S Stein Line Bergen vs. Deo P. Natividad G.R. No. 154798 October 20, 2005, involving a Chief Mate who was still able to return to his former employment after almost three (3) years, the Supreme Court still affirmed the award of permanent total disability benefits and compensation, thus:

          "Petitioners tried to contest the above findings by showing that respondent was able to work again as a chief mate in March 2001. Nonetheless, this information does not alter the fact that as a result of his illness, respondent was unable to work as a chief mate for almost three years. It is of no consequence that respondent was cured after a couple of years. The law does not require that the illness should be incurable. What is important is that he was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability. (GSIS v. Cadiz, G.R. No. 154093, 8 July 2003, 405 SCRA 450, 454). An award of a total and permanent disability benefit would be germane to the purpose of the benefit, which is to help the employee in making ends meet at the time when he is unable to work."

          In the Crystal Shipping case, the Supreme Court, in denying the employers' motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court could not clearer in protecting the Filipino seafarers in general, thus:

          "Concerning the first ground, petitioners argues that the Court erred in defining permanent disability as inability for work for more than 120 days based on decisions applying the provisions of the Labor Code. Petitioners add that such provisions apply only to disability benefit claims under the Government Service Insurance System and the Social Security System. Petitioners further contend that there was no provision in the POEA Contract providing that disability lasting continuously for more than 120 days shall be deemed total and permanent.

Petitioners misread our decision, which we quote in part:

          In resolving the merits of the case, we find pertinent Section 30 of the POEA Memorandum Circular No. 55, Series of 1996, which provides the schedule of disability or impediment for injuries suffered and illness contracted. The particular illness of the respondent is not within those enumerated. But the same provision supplies us with the guideline that any item in the schedule classified under grade 1 constitutes total and permanent disability.

          Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. As gleaned from the records, respondent was unable to work from August 18, 1998 to February 22, 1999, at least, or more than 120 days, due to his medical treatment. This clearly shows that his disability was permanent.

          Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness. In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning incapacity.

          Although the company-designated doctors and respondent's physician differ in their assessments of the degree of respondent's disability, both found that respondent was unfit for sea-duty due to respondent's need for regular medical check-ups and treatment which would not be available if he were at sea. There is no question in our mind that respondent's disability was total. (Emphasis supplied.)

          It is clear from the foregoing that any item in the schedule of disability or impediment for injuries suffered and illness contracted classified under Grade 1 necessarily constitutes total and permanent disability.

          Admittedly, POEA Memorandum Circular No. 55, Series of 1996 does not measure disability in terms of number of days but by grading only. Since respondent's physician classified his disability as Grade 1, the same was necessarily total and permanent regardless of the number of days he was disabled.

          However, if only to bolster respondent physician's grading and its concomitant classification as total and permanent disability, this Court noted that respondent's inability to work lasted from August 18, 1998 to February 22, 1999, or for more than 120 days. Even without this observation though, we would have reached the same conclusion since respondent's physician classified his disability as Grade 1 while the company-designated physicians declared him "disabled permanently." More importantly, these findings were fully supported by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC which both concluded that respondent's disability was total and permanent.

          The second and third grounds are interrelated and we shall discuss them jointly. Petitioners aver that since the company-designated physicians had assessed respondent's disability as Grade 9, respondent was only entitled to disability benefits equivalent to Grade 9 pursuant to the POEA Contract. Petitioners also contend that by relying on the classification made by respondent's physician, this Court providing that assessments made by company-designated physicians are determinative of the disability and the various disability gradings thereunder.

          These arguments had already been passed upon and found to be without merit by the NLRC. In its Resolution dated April 9, 2002, the NLRC declared that medical certificates issued by the company-designated physicians are palpably self-serving and therefore should not be given evidentiary weight and value.

          This pronouncement finds significance when viewed in the light of the company-designated physician's conclusion that respondent could no longer go back to sea-duty and hence, was disabled permanently. Yet, such company-designated physician and the two others who subsequently examined respondent gave the latter a partial impediment Grade 9 classification. In effect, they declared respondent's disability as partial and permanent.

          As borne out by the records, respondent became unfit for sea-duty due to his need for regular check-up and treatment which would otherwise be unavailable if he were at sea. More specifically, respondent was unable to work as chief mate for almost three years. As we have said, permanent total disability is the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do.

          Having said that, the findings of respondent's physician was more attuned to respondent's actual physical state which led not only this Court but also the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC to conclude that the findings of the company-designated physicians could not be given evidentiary weight and value.

          As a final note, we reiterate that the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seamen is designed primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seaman in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels. Its provisions must, therefore, be construed and applied fairly, reasonably and liberally in their favor. Only then can its beneficent provisions be fully carried into effect."

          In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of the POEA SEC, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. (Art. 10, Civil Code) It should never be forgotten that the POEA SEC is designed primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seaman in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels. Its provisions must, therefore, be construed and applied fairly, reasonably and liberally in their favor. Only then can its beneficent provisions be fully carried into effect. (Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 123891, 28 February 2001, 353 SCRA 47, 54)

HONG KONG COURT OF FINAL APPEAL DECLARES AS NULL AND VOID SECTIONS 20(G) AND 29 OF THE POEA STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT


         The Philippine Government labels the Filipino OFWs, including Filipino Seafarers, as "The Modern Day Heroes".

          Ironically, on 31 May 2000, then DOLE Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma signed Department Order No. 4, Series of 2000 ("POEA Standard Employment Contract") amending the 1996 POEA Standard Employment Contract governing the employment of Filipino Seafarers on-board ocean-going vessels, wherein new provisions were added that apparently give undue advantage to employers.

        Section 29 thereof, states that, "In cases of claims and disputes arising from this employment, the parties covered by a collective bargaining agreement shall submit the claim or dispute to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. If the parties are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the parties may at their option submit the claim or dispute to either the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 8042 otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 or to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel or arbitrators. If there is no provision as to the voluntary arbitrators to be appointed by the parties, the same shall be appointed from the accredited voluntary arbitrators of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the Department of Labor and Employment. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) shall exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide disciplinary action on cases, which are administrative in character, involving or arising out of violations of recruitment laws, rules and regulations involving employers, principals, contracting partners and Filipino seafarers."

        On the other hand, Section 20(G) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract, provides that, "The seafarer or his successor in interest acknowledges that payment for injury, illness, incapacity, disability or death of the seafarer under this contract shall cover all claims arising from or in the course of the seafarer's employment, including but not limited to damages arising from the contract, tort, fault or negligence under the laws of the Philippines or any other country."

        Thereafter, employers have been moving for the dismissal of cases filed by Filipino Seafarers both locally and overseas on ground of lack of jurisdiction due to the above-quoted provision which they maintain to be an Arbitration Clause, that is, all these cases should only be filed in the Philippines either before the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators or before the NLRC.

        A classic example of this undue advantage granted to employers by the 2000 POEA Standard Employment Contract involves the luxury liner SS Norway. The SS Norway had just arrived from a cruise and had docked at the Port of Miami when a boiler exploded on 25 May 2003, killing 8 crewmen (6 Filipinos; 1 Jamaican; 1 Pakistani) and seriously injuring 10. Many of the victims were from the Philippines. The National Transportation Safety Board concluded that a weld on a seam of a high-pressure drum ruptured, releasing nearly 20 tonnes of scalding water that turned into steam and swept through the engine room and adjacent crew quarters. The heirs of the dead crewmen instituted complaints to claim damages. The complaints of the heirs of the Filipino crewmen were all dismissed by virtue of the above-quoted Section 29, 2000 POEA Standard Employment Contract; while those filed by the heirs of the Jamaican and Pakistani crewmen proceeded and were eventually awarded nearly US$2 million each. The heirs of the Filipino crewmen were forced to accept the measly offer of settlement by the shipowner.

        On 21 May 2008, US District Judge Federico Moreno ordered the shipowner to pay a US$1 million fine after the company pleaded guilty to have operated its vessel in a "Grossly negligent manner that endangered the lives, limbs and property of the persons on board" 5 years after the horrific boiler explosion on the SS Norway. In addition, the said Judge ordered the shipowner to pay US$13.75 million preliminary restitution to the 18 victims.

        Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Offices have continuously fought for the right of Filipino Seafarers and their heirs to file cases overseas despite Section 29 of the 2000 POEA Standard Employment Contract.

        In one case involving Paquito L. Buton, who was ordered by the master to straighten a bent portion of the ladder using a sledge hammer, a fragment thereof flew out like a metal shrapnel and struck his right eye cause him to lose eyesight. Buton filed a complaint before the Hong Kong District Court to claim disability compensation under the Hong Kong Employees' Compensation Ordinance (ECO). But the District Court did not assume jurisdiction on ground that Buton is a party to an arbitration agreement under Section 29 of the 2000 POEA Standard Employment Contract. Buton appealed therefrom.

        On 28 April 2008, the Court of Final Appeal of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region rendered a judgment granting Buton's appeal and declaring as null and void the POEA Standard Employment Contract in so far as it is a contractual attempt of Buton's employers to reduce liability under the ECO, and it prevents Filipino Seafarers from filing a claim for common law damages in addition to contractual compensation.

        The Court added that the POEA Standard Employment Contract could not be accepted by the Hong Kong court applying Hong Kong law as a valid basis to stop a claim under the ECO. The Court emphasized that for a loss of one eye, the POEA Standard Employment Contract only provides a compensation of US$20,900.00; while ECO provides for a disability compensation of US$67,284.00. Further more, ECO preserves the seafarer's right to claim common law damages in addition to the above compensation; while under Section 20(G) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract, receipt of the compensation covers all claims arising from or related to the employment under Philippine law and the laws of any other country.

        It is quite embarrassing for a foreign court to declare as null and void the POEA Standard Employment Contract; while Philippine courts continue to apply its provisions prejudicial to the rights of Filipino Seafarers whom we hail as "The Modern Day Heroes".